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CIVIL DISTURBANCES, MASS PROCESSING AND MISDEMEANANTS:
RIGHTS, REMEDIES AND REALITIES
In the 1960s the United States experienced riots
and other civil disturbances on a scale unparalleled
in its history. Society's response to the stress of a
serious civil disturbance is a prime indicator of its
strengths and weaknesses. This paper will discuss
one aspect of that response-the operations of the
court system. Specifically it will deal with the
treatment given persons suspected of having com-
mitted a misdemeanor or minor offense," such as
disturbing the peace,2 disorderly conduct, 3 inciting
to riot,4 riot,5 criminal nuisance,6 or unlawful as-
semblyY These people, if convicted, will serve only
a short sentence or pay a fine; they are, neverthe-
less, entitled to due process of law. The problem is
to ensure that the suspected misdemeanant be ac-
corded due process during periods when the
demands for expeditious processing of mass ar-
restees overtax judicial resources.
I. PROCEDuRAL DIFFERENCES iN TiiE TREATmENT
OF AN ACCUSED MISDEMEANANT
AND AN ACCUSED FELON
In most jurisdictions there are substantial pro-
cedural differences in the treatment accorded ac-
cused misdemeanants and accused felons. The
right to a preliminary examination to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the crime is, in many juris-
SBLAceK's LAW DicnToNARY 1150 (4th ed. 1951)
defines "misdemeanors" as "offenses lower than felonies
and generally those punishable by fine or imprisonment
other than in a penitentiary."
Statutes define what offenses constitute misde-
meanors. See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 17 (West 1968
Supp.); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-11 (1967).
2 Anx. STAT. ANN. § 41-1401 (1964); CAL. PEN.
ConE § 415 (West 1955).8 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20 (McKinney 1967).4CAL. PEN. CODE § 404.6 (West 1968 Supp.); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-5304 (1968 Supp.); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 240.08 (McKinney 1967).
8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 405 (West 1968 Supp.); GA.
CODE AN. § 26-5302 (1953); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.05 (McKinney 1967) (riot in the second degree).
In some jurisdictions this is a felony.
6 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05 (McKinney 1967).
7GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5301 (1953); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.10 (McKinney 1967).
8 State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d
888, 893 (1967).
dictions, available only to the accused felon. 9
Moreover, the right usually given accused felons to
prosecution by indictment0 or information may
not be accorded the accused misdemenant." In ad-
dition, formal arraignment may not be necessary
in misdemeanor cases, 2 or, if it is required, the
presence of the defendant may not be mandatory
as is usually the case with felonies.'8
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, applied
to the states by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Gideon v. Wainwright,4 has not yet been
held applicable in misdemeanor cases.il Also, the
right to trial by jury, recently applied to the states
by the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 16 is not
applicable if the defendant is charged with only a
"petty offense". Although the Court declined to
draw the line between petty and serious offenses,
it is clear that state designation of an offense as a
"misdemeanor" is not determinative 7 Some mis-
demeanor trials, therefore, must have a jury in
absence of waiver by the defendant. s
9 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 109-3(a), 109-1(b)(3);
ch. 37, § 624(a) (1967).is The fifth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States requires that "[nlo person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment by a Grand
ury.... .. " The term "infamous crime" has been con-
strued to apply to any serious crime .which carries an
infamous penalty, i.e. one for which the accused is
subject to possible imprisonment in a penitentiary.
Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886). This
right has not been applied to the states under the
fourteenth amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884); Morford v. Hocker, 394 F.2d 169
(9th Cir. 1968).
" CAL. PEN. CODE § 682 (West 1956), § 1425 (West
1968 Supp.).
" N.Y. CODE or C=n. PEoc. §§ 296, 4 (McKinney;
1958); But see Gouker v. State, 224 Md. 514, 528-29,
168 A.2d 521 (1961), applying the arraignment re-
qirement to misdemeanor cases by rule.
"N.Y. CODE or Cans. PRoc. § 297 (McKinney
1958).
4 372 U.S.335 (1963).
15 See Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 685 (1968) and notes 43-78
infra and accompanying text.
16 391 U.S. 145 (1968). This decision does not apply
retroactively. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631
(1968).
17 391 U.S. at 159, citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966).
18The Court in Duncan expressly refrained fr6m
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An accused misdemeanant, if convicted, will be
branded with the stigma of a criminal record,19 yet
he may not be accorded the full complement of
criminal rights.
IL THE CRmEnmAL PROCESS nr CIAos
The following pattern was typical during the
riots in Chicago in April, 1968, following the assas-
sination of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
2 0
People were arrested in great numbers and brought
to detention centers, where they were fingerprinted
and processed to discover whether they had a
criminal record. Since great numbers of arrests
caused a slowdown in the search for records, those
arrested remained in the detention centers for at
least several hours until the fingerprints and proc-
essing came back from headquarters. During this
period no further processing occurred. Counsel had
trouble finding their clients. Moreover, lawyers,
who had no clients but went to the jails because
attorneys were needed, were not allowed to enter.
At first, there were no bond hearings; or, if there
were, they were held in mass; people accused of
certain offenses had the same bonds set for them,
irrespective of individual circumstances.n
drawing the line between petty offenses and serious
crimes. 391 U.S. at 161. The state decisions after
Duncan which have attempted to draw the line have
not been consistent. See United Farm Workers Or-
ganizing Com. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 513
(Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (trial by jury mandatory where
maximum penalty was 55 days in jail and $5500 fine);
State v. Owens, 102 N.J. Super. 187, 245 A.2d 736
(1968) (1 year sentence and $1000 fine not serious
crime); People v. Morgenbesser, 293 N.Y.S.2d 397
(Sup. Ct. 1968) (maximum penalty of 1 year, no jury
trial required); People v. Bowdoin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 748
(Crim. Ct. N.Y.C. 1968) (maximum penalty of 1
year is a serious offense). For the effect that Duncan
might have on offenses frequently associated with
civil disturbances, see note 59 infra and accompanying
text.
The decisions are also inconsistent on the issue
whether a juvenile offender subject to commitment to a
reformatory for several years is entitled to a jury trial
under Duncan. See DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb.
461, 469-70, 161 N.W.2d 508, 512, 519 (1968) (no);
People v. Morgenbesser, supra (yes); People v. Y.O.
2404, 57 Misc. 2d 30, 291 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (no).19 See note I supra.
20The factual information in this section was
acquired during a May, 1969 interview with Mr.
Kermit Coleman, attorney for the Roger Baldwin
Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union, and
volunteer counsel during the Chicago disturbances in
April, 1968, and during the Democratic Convention
week, August, 1968.
21 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 110-5 (1967) provides
in part:
(a) The amount of bail shall be:
Although Illinois statutes provide that counsel
may petition for bond reduction hearings,2 there
was no opportunity to amass the information from
those in custody necessary to support such peti-
tions. In the beginning only lawyers from the
Public Defender's Office were allowed in the court-
room. There were not enough attorneys, however,
to assure every accused misdemeanant adequate
representation. ' Bonds were set high to keep
people off the streets and most remained in jail.
After several days, when the level of disturbances
had diminished, the State's Attorney's Office eased
the restrictions on allowing counsel into the deten-
tion centers. Also, volunteer counsel were then al-
lowed to interview prisoners who had not con-
tacted them previously. Bond reduction hearings
were set for the following day (i.e., seven days after
the first arrests) when most arrestees had their
bonds reduced24 and were released. Because the
preliminary examination 9 is not mandatory in
misdemeanor prosecutions in Illinois, 2 most of
those arrested .and charged with misdemeanors
were released and did not return to court until
trial . 7
The administration of justice during the riots in
Detroit in the summer of 1967 followed a similar
pattern.H People were arrested in groups and
(1) Sufficient to assure compliance with the
conditions set forth in the bail bond;
(2) Not oppressive;
(3) Commensurate with the nature of the offense
charged;(4) Considerate of the past criminal acts and
conduct of the defendant;(5) Considerate of the financial ability of the
accused.
See Ginsberg, Volunteer Lawyers Retrieve Due Process
in Chicago, 26 LEGAL Am BRTP CASE 207 (1968).
2 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 110-6 (1967).
2 Other lawyers who were present maintain that
retained and volunteer counsel aside from the public
defender's office were allowed in the courtrooms at
all times. Interview with Mr. James B. Haddad,
Assistant State's Attorney.
2 The courts, while reducing the amount of the
bonds, refused to release people on their own recog-
nizance, which is statutorily permissible. ILL. Rnv.
STAT., ch. 38, § 110-2 (1967).
2 See note 10, supra and accompanying text.6 See note 9, supra.
2 Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, attorney
for the Roger Baldwin Foundation, American Civil
Liberties Union, and volunteer counsel during the
Chicago disturbances in April, 1968, and during the
Democratic Convention week, August, 1968. See also
Ginsberg, supra note 21, at 207.
2 For a thorough discussion of the events in Wash-
ington, D.C. after the King assassination, April 4-15,
1968, see Comment, The Response of the Washington,
D.C. Community and Its Criminal Justice System to
the April 1968 Riot, 37 GEo. WAsHr. L. REv. 862 (1969).
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'herded into overcrowded and inadequate detention
lacilities. Certain functions such as prose'cutorial
,screening were oriented toward mass rather than
,individual justice."' Bail was originally set high
and then lowered when disturbances in the streets
had calmed down.3 Counsel were not permitted to
-see prisoners unless they knew their names. When
volunteer counsel were allowed into jail, their
numbers were insufficient to provide individual
representation. 12 When preliminary examinations
-were held, they were often bursory.P
It is significant that this pattern apparently did
not prevail during the Democratic Convention
week in Chicago, August 25-29, 1968. Although
the situation in the streets was chaotic,N there was
ample legal representation for all those arrested.
Bonds were set at $25 or $50 for misdemeanor
charges, and few people spent the night in jail
against their will. 5 These procedures are custom-
ary in misdemeanor cases in Chicago," although in
felony cases bail is set high -without regard to
individual circumstances and few people are re-
leased quickly. This is true both in Cook Countyn7
and in other large metropolitan areas throughout
the nation."'
The difference in treatment accorded accused
misdemeanants during the Convention and during
the other instances mentioned is probably due to
29 REPORT Op THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMIssIoN
ON Crvm DxsoRnDRs 341 (Bantam ed. 1968) [here-
inafter referred to as the KERNER CommssloN REPORT]
20 Id.
3Id. at-341-42; Comment, The Administration of
Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July,
1967, 66 M&ch. L. R.v. 1542, 1549-50 (1968); Seng-
stock, Riots and Mass Criminal Justice: The Collapse
of the Bill of Rights, 26 LEGAL Am BT?- CASE 201,
203 (1968).
3KERNER CosnrsSloN REPORT, supra note 29, at
342; The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the
Detroit Civil Disorder of July, 1967, supra note 31, at
1553.
3 Sengstock, supra note 31, at 206.
21 See RIGHTs 1N CONFLIcT, THE WALK R REPORT
To TE NATIoNAL ComaSSioN ON T=E CAusES AND
PREVENTION OP VIOLENCE (Bantam Books 1968)
[hereinafter referred to as the WArxER REPORT].
3 Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra note
20.
"Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra
note 20.
37 See Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53
ILL. BAR 1. 674, 675 (1965); Silverstein, Bail in the
State Courts-A Field Study and- Report, 50 Mnvn. L.
REv. 621, 626-27, 638 (1966).
38See Silverstein, supra note 37, at 626-27, 638;
Foote, Markle and Wooley, Compelling Appearance
in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1954); Note, A Survey of the Ad-
ministration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 693 (1958).
the fact that only several hundred people were
arrested in Chicago as a result of the Convention
-disturbances" while several thousand persons were
arrested in the wake of the Chicago riot in April,
1968,10 in the Detroit riot in July, 1967, and in
Newark that same summer.a This suggests that
even during periods of turmoil, the judicial system
can operate in a competent and fair manner. It also
suggests that there is a breaking point beyond
which accepted judicial and aclministrative pro-
cedures are sacrificed for the sake of expediency.
As will be discussed later, however, it appears that
proper organization of the available resources can
lessen the likelihood of this breakdown during dis-
turbances of the same magnitude as those ex-
perienced in Chicago, Detroit or Newark."
IIM. CRITIQUE OF TE PROCESS
A. Right to Counsel for Indigent Misdemeanants
As already noted, the right to appointed
counsel, held applicable to state felony prosecu-
tions in Gideon v. Wainwright,4 has not been held
applicable to misdemeanor prosecutions. State
provisions concerning the right to counsel for
indigents in misdemeanor cases vary. Some spe-
cifically restrict the right to counsel to felony
cases,4 others grant appointed counsel only in
certain misdemeanor cases,' 6 some states provide
counsel in almost every case4' and one state seems
to require that an indigent defendant be provided
t According to figures received in a telephone inter-
view with Chicago Corporation Counsel's Office, the
number arrested was 676.
40 Ginsberg, supra note 21, at 209, says approximately
2000 were arrested. The latest available statistics show
that there were 2574 arrested.
1 There were 7231 arrested in Detroit and 1510 in
Newark. KERN CcamnSsiON REPORT, supra note
29, at 339 n.3.
42 See notes 144-154 infra and accompanying text.
"3 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
44 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45 See, e.g., HAwAII REv. STAT. § 705-5 (1968); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 29-1803.01, 29-1804 (Supp. 1967);
TENN. CODE Am. §§ 40-2014 to 40-2018 (Supp. 1968).
4 CONN. GE . STAT. ANN. § 54-81(a) (1968) (in the
court's discretion- "in the interest of justice"); M.D. R.
PRoc. 719(b) (2) (Supp. 1969) (counsel shall be ap-
pointed when the maximum penalty is six months'
imprisonment and/or $500 fine and "may" be ap-
pointed in other cases); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-64-2
(Supp. 1969) (when there is a possibility of confinement
for more than six months).
4 People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d
358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965); People v. Letterio, 16
N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965).
It appears to be the rule in New York that coulisel
must be appointed in all but traffic prosecutions.
1970]
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with counsel in every case.4s These procedural
differences raise the question whether the constitu-
tional right to counsel should be held applicable
to at least some misdemeanor prosecutions.
One argument why this right should be so ap-
plied is, that the Sixth Amendment does not dis-
tinguish between felonies and misdemeanors and
that such a distinction is unreasonable.a In other
words, Gideon, which has been interpreted as
applying only to felony cases,50 should be extended.
If counsel is necessary to ensure a fair trial, it is
necessary in cases designated by the state as "mis-
demeanors".51 If "... in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him ... ' -
then that defendant needs counsel as badly as an
accused felon does. 3 This is particularly true in a
civil disturbance situation, where the defendants
are often from disadvantaged groups and not
4 In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42
Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965); Blake v. Municipal Court, 242
Cal. App. 2d 857, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771, 773 (1966); In re
Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 614, 427 P.2d 179, 184, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 579, 584 (1967). -
For a detailed summary of present state provisions
concerning right to counsel for accused misdemeanants,
see Junker, T& Right to Counsel In Misdemeanor
Cases, 43 WAms. L. R.v. 685, 719-34 (1968).49 See Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir.
1942):
The petitioner would be as effectively deprived of
his liberty by a sentence to a year in jail for the
crime of nonsupport of a minor child [a federal
misdemeanor] as by a sentence to a year in jail
for any other crime, however serious. And so far
as the right to assistance of counsel is concerned,
the Constitution draws no distinction between loss
of liberty for a short period and such loss for a
long one.
50 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967); denials
of cert. in Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966) and
Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
It is clear that there is no magic in the designa-
tion of a crime as a misdemeanor, or felony. We
must look to the consequences of conviction of
crime rather than classification. The impact on an
accused who suffers loss of liberty by-incarceration
in a penal institution is the same no matter how
the crime of which he was convicted was classified.
State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 399, 154 N.W.2d 888,
895 (1967). See also Junker, supra note 48, at 687-93.
2Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
53
A defendant in court on a charge defined as
a misdemeanor is as helpless to defend himself as
he would be if he were charged with a gross mis-
demeanor or felony.
State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888,
893 (1967).
highly educated.U Furthermore, a misdemeanor
charge arising out of a civil disturbance may not be
easy to defend at trial. A disorderly conduct charge,
for example, is difficult to defend because the
statutory language is often vague. 5 Since it seems
that in riot situations people are sometimes ar-
rested and charged with disorderly conduct or other
misdemeanors just to keep them off the streets,6
there is a real danger that innocent people will be
convicted if they are forced to defend themselves
without the aid of counsel.
The reasoning in Duncan v. LouisianaU suggests-
that the right to appointed counsel for indigents
should be extended to at least some misdemeanor
prosecutions. In Duncan, the defendant was con-
victed of simple battery, a misdemeanor under
Louisiana law, and sentenced to 60 days in prison
and a $150 fine. The maximum sentence for this
crime was two years' imprisonment and a $300,
fine. Because the Louisiana Constitution grants
jury trials only in cases where capital punishment
or imprisonment at hard labor may be involved,a
Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is applica-
ble to all state prosecutions, felony or misde-
meanor, except those which are for "petty
offenses" as opposed to serious crimes. 9 The
54 Kxa_,u ComissioN REPORT, supra note 29,
at 352-54.
51 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1967}
provides:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when,
with intent to cause public inconvenience, an-
noyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof:
... 2. He makes unreasonable noise....
16Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra
note 20.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
5 LA. CoNST. Art. VII., § 41.
19 As noted above, see note 18 supra, the Court
refused to draw the line between petty offenses and
serious crimes. The Court did say, however, that
"... the penalty authorized for a particular crime is,
of major relevance in determining whether it is a
serious crime or not and may in itself if severe enough
subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amend-
ment." 391 U.S. at 159. In light of the Court's reference
to the fact that in the federal system petty offenses
are those punishable by no more than six months in
prison and a $500 fine (18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)), and to
the fact that most states provide jury trials for offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment,
it appears that some offenses common to civil dis-
turbances may be included in this test. See, e.g., CAL.
PEN. CODE § 405 (West 1968 Supp.) (riot-maximum
penalty one year in prison and $1000 fine); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-5301 (1953), 27-2506 (1968 Supp.) (unlaw-
ful assemblies-maximum penalty one year in prison
[Vol. 6T
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rationale of the Court was that the presence of a
jury is a valuable safeguard in assuring ihe de-
fendant a fair trial and is fundamental to the
American system of justice:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge.... T]he jury trial provi-
sions of the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a fundamental decision about the exer-
cise of official power-a reluctance to entrust
plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges....
... Our conclusion is that in the American
States, as in the federal judicial system, a gen-
eral grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a
fundamental right, essential for preventing
miscarriages of justice and for assuring that
fair trials are provided for alldefendants.
60
Since the right to trial by jury has been con-
sidered fundamental to a fair trial and accordingly
been applied to all serious crimes regardless of their
designation as felonies or misdemeanors, it seems
that the right of indigents to appointed counsel
should also extend to all serious crimes.
It is conceivable that a fair trial may be had
before an impartial judge without a jury, but
it is hardly conceivable that a person ignorant
in the field of law can adequately defend him-
self without the assistance of counsel-a
These considerations, when viewed in light of
and $1000 fine); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.05 (riot in
the second degree), 240.08 (inciting to riot) (McKinney
1967) (both have maximum penalty of imprisonment
for one year).
c" 391 U.S. at 156-58.
61 State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 398, 154 N.W.2d
888, 894 (1967). In this case defendant, charged with
a misdemeanor, requested the court to appoint counsel
for him and the court refused, although defendant
claimed he was indigent. Defendant was convicted
and sentenced to a $100 fine or 30 days in the countyjail. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held, not as a
matter of constitutional law but rather in the exercise
of its supervisory power, that counsel must be provided
in any case, felony or misdemeanor, in which the
court is empowered to impose a jail sentence, even if
the sentence is the alternative, to the payment of a
fine, where the defendant is indigent.
Several lower federal court decisions have held the
right to dounsel applicable to misdemeanor prosecutions
where imprisonment was imposed on sixth amendment
grounds. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.
1965); Rutledge v. City of Miami, 267 F. Supp. 885
(S.D. Fla. 1967).
the fact that some "misdemeanors" carry extreme
penalties,12 provide a persuasive basis for arguing
that the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be
appointed for all indigents accused of serious
crimes.0
It also can be argued that denying the right to
counsel to indigent misdemeanants violates equal
protection" since the trials or appeals of two people
should not vary in result solely because one can
afford a lawyer and one cannot;65 Thus, upon the
first appeal of a felony conviction, indigents are
entitled to appointed counsel, 68 who are required to
act as advocates rather than amici curiae.1
The equal protection guarantee also may provide
the indigent with a free transcript of record pend-
ing appeal or other post-conviction proceedings. s
Since defendants in civil disturbance situations are
often poor members of minority groups, the equal
protection argument for their right to counsel is
highly persuasive.
6See, e.g., N.J. Ruv. STAT. § 2A:118-1 (1952) (life
imprisonment for kidnapping, a high misdemeanor).
6It is sometimes said (see, e.g., Junker, supra note
48) that just as Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
has not been restricted to felony cases even though
Mapp itself involved a felony. (see Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)), neither should Gideon,
which involved a felony, be so restricted. The analogy
is imperfect and the reasoning does not follow. Mapp,
which held that evidence illegally obtained under the
fourth amendment is inadmissible in state prosecutions,
was not concerned with the right to a fair trial as was
Gideon. In Mapp the Court was motivated by what it
considered to be unconscionable invasions by the
government of one's privacy and by the necessity of
maintaining the dignity and integrity of the court in
not receiving unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
The classification of a crime as a felony or misdemeanor
is irrelevant to these policy considerations. See Mapp
at 657, 659, and Sdmerber at 767. In the right to counsel
situation the argument can be made that supplying
counsel in misdemeanor cases would place too great
a burden on the state and that penalties for misde-
meanors are too light to require the state to assume
the burden.
14See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. California, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
65 See Junker, supra note 48, at 693-95.
66 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
67 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
68Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956), cf. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fees
for writ of habeas corpus and on appeal). But see
Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963); Mack v.
Walker, 372 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1966).
See Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969),
which seems to hold that an indigent defendant con-
victed of a petty offense is constitutionally entitled to
a free transcript where the state law provides him an
appeal as a matter of right. This is a 2-page per curiam
opinion, however, with no dissents and one concur-
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There are difficulties, however, with arguing that
equal protection requires appointed counsel for
indigent misdemeanants. First, since the equal
protection argument can be extended literally to
most situations, it is difficult to determine what is
actually a deprivation of equal protection. For
example, is a state constitutionally required to ap-
point a psychiatrist for an indigent who wishes to
plead insanity?69 Is it required to pay for a private
investigator for an indigent defendant because a
more wealthy defendant might have employed
one?70 The provision of either a psychiatrist or a
private investigator might affect the outcome of a
trial as significantly as might the presence of
counsel. Yet, especially in the case of the private
investigator,7 it does not seem reasonable to re-
quire the state to procure such services for the
defendant. The state is financially incapable of
eliminating all differences between the rich and
the poor.
The second difficulty is that the argument is un-
necessary. The constitution has a specific provision
covering the point: the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The arguments that the right should apply
to state misdemeanants should if possible be based
on that provision, rather than on the vague and
troublesome Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This approach avoids the
difficulties encountered above.
A final argument for applying the right to
counsel to misdemeanants is that since the right
rence, by Mr. Justice Black, without opinion. The
Court cites equal protection cases, such as Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477; Draper v. Wash-
ington, 372 U.S. 487; and Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305, among others. The Court holds that the fact that
an indigent under Oklahoma law cannot get a tran-
script while one who can afford it can, is "an 'un-
reasoned distinction' which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids the State to make." 395 U.S. at 460. No
discussion, however, is addressed to the fact that the
defendant was convicted of only a petty offense.
69 A request for funds by an indigent for conducting
an independent psychiatric examination was denied
in Houghtaling v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 163
S.E.2d 560 (1968). In Foster v. Commonwealth, 209
Va. 297, 163 S.E.2d 565 (1968), the court refused to
provide an independent chemical examination of
physical evidence where the FBI tests were available
for his inspection.
70 A request for an investigator at state expense was
denied in San Miguel v. McCarthy, 8 Ariz. App. 323,
446 P.2d 22 (1968).71 It is conceded that a strong argument may be made
that the state does have to furnish an impartial psy-
chiatrist where an indigent defendant wishes to plead
insanity.
applies to any "critical" pretrial stage,72 it should
apply to misdemeanants because in the investiga-
tory stages it is impossible to tell with what the
suspect will be charged, if anything.7 The argu-
ment has particular force in a civil disturbance
situation, where people are arrested in masses and
where in the confusion one is liable to be charged
with almost anything. It is unclear in this ap-
proach, however, why the right to counsel should
apply once the case is conclusively treated as a
misdemeanor.
The main argument against applying the right
to counsel in misdemeanor cases, as implied above,
is that the requirement of appointing counsel for
indigents in those cases would place too great a
burden on the administration of criminal justice,
that too many attorneys would be needed and that
the cost to the state would be too great. The Con-
stitution, the argument goes, requires a balancing
of the interests of the state and the individual.
Since misdemeanors usually carry light penalties,
it is claimed that the interest of the accused mis-
demeanant in having counsel appointed for him is
not sufficient to outweigh the interest of the state
in preventing the financial expense necessary to
provide counsel.
If bar associations were sufficiently mobilized,
especially in civil disturbance situations, to effec-
tively cooperate with the courts in providing
counsel, the expense should not be overwhelming.
Also, it is questionable whether the burden of ap-
pointing counsel for all indigent defendants
charged with serious misdemeanors would be
greater than the burden of providing jury trials for
them, which burden did not seem to bother the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Duncan
decision.7 4 In any event, speedy and inexpensive
criminal justice administration does not justify an
unfair trial35
7 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964).
71 See Junker, supra note 48, at 695-96.
71 See notes 57-62 supra and accompanying text.
75
We are persuaded that the possible loss of lib-
erty by an innocent person charged with a mis-
demeanor, who does not know how to defend
himself, is too sacred a right to be sacrificed on
the alter of expedience. Any society that can afford
a professional prosecutor to prosecute this type
of crime must assume the burden of providing
adequate defense, to the end that innocent people
will noi be convicted without having facilities
available to properly present a defense.
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In addition, under recidivist statutes, which
many states have,76 a subsequent misdeineanor
may be elevated to the status of a felony because
of a prior misdemeanor conviction. It has been
held in at least two- cases that where an accused
was not afforded counsel at his prior misdemeanor
conviction, such conviction could not be used to
elevate the status of his subsequent misdemeanor
conviction to a felony and still be valid under the
Sixth Amendment.7 On an administrative level
(i.e. giving effect to recidivist statutes without
risking reversals and new trials on right to counsel
grounds), as well as on a constitutional level, it
therefore seems desirable that the right to counsel
be applied to all but petty offense cases.P
B. Bail
In the federal system an accused, under the Bail
Reform Act of 1966' 9 and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,"0 has a right to be released on
bail before trial if charged with any crime other
than a capital offense. The Bail Reform Act
requires that bail be set no higher than that neces-
sary to assure the defendant's presence at trial.
In determining this amount the judicial officer
must consider the individual circumstances of the
accused, such as his employment, family ties, and
length of residence in the community." These pro-
visions are a codification of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Stack v.
Boyle," which held that bail set higher than ai
amount reasonably calculated to assure the pres-
State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 399, 154 N.W.2d 888,
894-95 (1967).
76 IOWA CODE ANN. § 747.2 (1969 Supp.); N.J.S.A. §
2A:85-12 (1968 Supp.).
7 State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907
(1968); Garcia v. State, 7 Ariz. App. 524, 441 P.2d
559 (1968). But see Ex parte Carpenter, 425 S.W.2d
821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
78 One might ask why petty offense cases should be
exempt from the requirement. Admittedly the dis-
tinction is arbitrary. Nevertheless, it would seem that
requiring that counsel be appointed for an indigent
in every case, including traffic offense cases, would so
tie up the court system and create such substantial
docket backlogs that fair trials could not be obtained
(e.g. witnesses may die) and the purpose of imposing
the right to counsel would be defeated. See Peterson,
J., concurring, in State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 401,
154 N.W.2d 888, 896 (1967); People v. Letterio, 16
N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965).
7 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (Supp. 11; 1964).
80 FED. R. C-M. P.46(a).
81 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (Supp. II, 1964); FED. R.
Cpmr. P.46(c).
8218 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (Supp. II, 1964).
8342 U.S. 1 (1951). -
ence of the defendant at trial is "excessive" under
the Eighth Amendment.8
The Supreme Court of the United States has
never held the Eighth Amendment bail provision
applicable to the States, although some courts
have assumed its application. 8 Most commentators
agree that the bail provision should and will be ap-
plied to the states because pretrial detention may
prejudice a defendant at trial 6 and because pre-
trial detention is incarceration' before the deter-
mination of guilt, and is therefore inherently, op-
posed to the fundamentals of the American system
of justice.F
Most states have the same statutory standards
as the federal system concerning the right to bail"
and the level at which bail is to be set, 8 but these
standards are often disregarded."0 Under existing
standards, there is little justification, even during
a civil disturbance, for setting bail at one thousand
dollars or more in misdemeanor cases." Since the
maximum punishment for most misdemeanors is
not heavy, it is doubtful that many accused mis-
demeanants will jump bail and risk a possibly
serious penalty. 2
Even if the accused can afford a lawyer, the
tasks of locating witnesses and documenting alibis
are time-consuming and costly. The accused mis-
demeanant may decide that it does not pay to
spend several hundred dollars in legal fees to avoid
paying a small fine. He should not be put in the
position of having either to hire a lawyer or plead
guilty. Moreover, aside from the question of
finances, pretrial detention may prejudicially affect
84 Id. at 4-5.
85 Reeves v. State, 411 P.2d 212, 215 (Alaska Sup.
Ct. 1966); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711(1964); Pilkinton v. Circuit Court of Howell County,
Missouri, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963).
"See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
8See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 1125 (1964); Packer, Two
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
39-46 (1964); Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts-A
Field Study and Report, 50 MINN. L. REv. 621, 644(1966).
"FLA. CONST. DECLARATION or RiGHTS § 9; ILL.
REv. STAT., Ch. 38, § 110-4 (1967); MIss. CONST.
Art. 3, § 29.
89 People ex rel Sammons v. Snow, 340 11. 464, 173
N.E. 8 (1930); People v. McDonald, 233 Mich. 98,
206 N.W. 516 (1925); Johnson v. State, 30 Ala. App.
593, 10 So. 2d 298 (1942); Ex parte Stegman, 112
N.J. Eq. 72, 163 A. 422 (1932).
"0See notes 119-143 infra and accompanying text.
"'Seenote 31 supra and accompanying text.2In federal cases the punishment given an accused
misdemeanant for jumping bail is a fine up to the
maximum provided for such misdemeanor and/or -one
year in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1969).
1970]
COMMENT
the accused at trial, for witnesses may never be
found and alibis may never be able to be docu-
mented ."
In addition, of course, where it can be shown
that the accused is a trustworthy, employed family
man,94 he should be released so that he can earn a
living during the pretrial period. Keeping the ac-
cused in jail when there is no good reason to do so
will only encourage disrespect and contempt for
the law, especially among those minority groups
that are often involved in civil disturbances.95
Aside from the amount of bail to be imposed to
assure the presence of the accused at trial, there are
two key issues concerning the administration of
bail. The first is whether the bail system itself is
constitutional when applied to indigents; the
second is whether a system of pretrial detention
should be substituted for or superimposed upon the
present bail system. The first issue is beyond the
scope of this paper.9" Preventive detention, how-
ever, must be considered because the considera-
tions relevant to a system of preventive detention
are especially prevalent in a civil disorder and
because judges sometimes use the present bail sys-
tem in an attempt to effect the purposes of pre-
ventive detention.Y7
It should be noted that most proposals for pre-
ventive detention affect only those accused of
crimes of violence, such as murder, rape and arson;
and those crimes are usually felonies.13 In a civil
disorder, however, certain misdemeanors, such as
inciting to riot and even disorderly conduct, may
93 See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
14 This assumes that the magistrate will take the
accused's personal situation into account. Such an
assumption may be incorrect when a serious civil
disturbance is in progress. See notes 21 and 31 supra.
9- KERER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at
352-54.
"8 For thorough discussions of the bail system, see
the authorities cited in note 87 supra. The arguments
that the bail system is unconstitutional as applied to
indigents are that by not being able to post bail and
so forced to remain in jail, the indigent is being pun-
ished by imprisonment before trial in violation of
substantive due process; he is adversely affected at
trial and so is deprived of a fair trial in violation of
procedural due process; he is denied pretrial liberty
only because of his indigence in violation of equal
protections requirements; and he is being denied his
right to bail 'under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments (assuming the Eighth Amendment grants a
right to bail and that it applies to the states) because
for him, any bail is "excessive." See Foote, supra note
87, at 1135.
7 See notes 120-124 infra, and accompanying text;
Packer, supra note 87, at 45.
I See, e.g., Note, Preventive Detention, 36 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 178, 187 (1967).
under some circumstances lead to violence. There-
fore, the possibility that the present proposals for
a system of preventive detention will be expanded
to include certain misdemeanors should not be
overlooked.
The argument in favor of preventive detention is
that there are certain defendants who constitute
such a threat to society that they should not be
released at any bail: if released they are likely to
commit further crimes or interfere with the proc-
esses of justice. A formal preventive detention
hearing, it is argued, will give the defendant a
chance to clear his name and will be at least as
trustworthy and more open than a judge's instinct
that a defendant is a threat to the community. 9
In a civil disturbance situation, one's potential for
disruption and violence is enhanced and the deten-
tion of certain people may help in quelling the
disturbance.10'
Those opposing preventive detention have ad-
vanced numerous arguments. It is difficult if not
impossible to establish meaningful standards and
criteria for deciding who should be detained. More-
over, it is difficult if not impossible to predict who
will commit a serious crime during the period of
pretrial release.io Furthermore, judges almost al-
ways overpredict how many are bad risks for
releasej"2 In addition, fact finding takes time,
sometimes weeks, during which the accused is
incarcerated. Appellate review is, in fact, inade-
quate and habeas corpus is slow.
Taken together, experience with these com-
parable proceedings gives no reason for opti-
mism that it would be possible to develop
procedures for adequate hearing on preventive
detention and administer them with sufficient
dispatch to avoid serious complications.0 3
0 Id. at 179-80.
,00 See Comment, The Administration of Justice in
the Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July, 1967, 66
Micn. L. Rxv. 1542, 1564-65 (1967).101
All of the criteria which might be used as stand-
ards for preventive detention share this charac-
teristic of being statistically infrequent. Probably
we know least about the degree of probability that
a defendant during the period of pretrial release
will commit a crime. Here we have no data at all,
but it is inconceivable that the probability is
higher than five percent and more likely it is con-
siderably lower. The other criteria noted-that the
defendant will intimidate witnesses or jurors or
injure a complainant-are apparently very rare,
statistically well below one percent.
Foote, supra note 87, at 1170.
10
2 Id. at 1172.
103 Id. at 1179-80.
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Finally, pretrial detention, preventive or other-
wise, jails one who has not been convicted of a
crime and thus impedes the preparation of his
defense by restricting his access to his attorney and
his ability to track. down witnesses °4' Meanwhile
earning capacity is cut off, pretrial confinement
may break down one's will to resist and innocent
people may plead guilty; all this before one is con-
victed of a crime.
0 5
The arguments against preventive detention are
perhaps best expressed by Professor Foote:
The addition of the label "preventive" does
not cleanse detention of its vices: pretrial
punishment and impairment of a fair trial.
The overwhelming objection to such deten-
tion is that the kinds of precise prediction of
future conduct which it requires cannot be
made with significant reliability even under
the best of fact finding and diagnostic circum-
stances.0
10 4 These impediments were apparent in the cases
following the Detroit riots. KEPNER ComtassioN
REPORT, supra note 29, at 350 n.18. See also Kamisar,
Belts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The R ight to Counsel
and Due Process Values, 61 MiCH. L. REv. 219,. 227
(1962).
A sample study of defendants arraigned in Man-
hattan Magistrate's Felony Court between October 16,
1961, and September 1, 1962, shows a definite cor-
relation between detention and unfavorable disposition
at trial.
TABLE 1
RELATIONSHP BETWEEN DSTENTION AND
UNPAvoRABrE DisPosrIoN
Disposition Bail (%) Jail (%).
Sentenced to prison ............ 17 64
Convicted without prison ....... 36 9
Not convicted ................ 47 27
Number of defendants ....... (374) (358)
Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 641, 642 (1964).
These findings provide strong support for the
notion that a causal relationship exists between
detention and unfavorable disposition .... The
results as they now stand ... do add strong sup-
port to the argument that pretrial detention in-




Imprisonment to protect society from unpre-
dicted but unconsummated offenses is so unpre-
cedented in this country and so fraught with
danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to
resort to it....
Jackson, J., sitting as Circuit Justice, in Williamson v.
United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282.(2d. Cir. 1950).
106 Foote, supra note 87, at 1182-83.
This paper will not attempt to resolve thepre-
ventive detention controversy. It is suggested,
however, that the best way to deal with accused
misdemeanants'07 is to administer the present bail
system fairly.
C. Preliminary Examination
As noted earlier,0 s an accused misdemeanant
may not have a right to a preliminary examination.
There is no federal constitutional requirement that
such an examination be held.l The question is,
therefore, whether an accused misdemeanant
should be accorded the right to a preliminary hear-
ing as a matter of state policy" 0
It is arguable that this right ought to be applied
to accused misdemeanants as well as accused felons
since probable cause must be established in either
case." The importance of the preliminary examina-
tion is attested to by the fact that in some cases it
has been held a "critical stage," making the right to
counsel at that time applicable in felony cases."2
If the danger exists in civil disturbances "... that
innocent bystanders will be swept into the process
and prosecuted without distinction from those
arrested with them.. . ," 11 then in theory it is
important that in civil disorders an accused mis-
demeanant be accorded a preliminary hearing,
since the determination of probable cause may
not be available through an indictment 4
On the other hand, in civil disorders the pre-
liminary examination is in fact often hurried and
not probative and does not afford real protection
from mistaken prosecution" 0 In some states it can
be adjourned for a certain length of time without
the accused's consent, during which time he is
either incarcerated or bailed."0 One's primary con-
107 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
"Is See note 10 supra.
109Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913);
Worts v. Dutton, 395 F.2d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
raThe preliminary examination dealt with here is
not the same as the bail hearing, to which both accused
felons and accused misdemeanants are usually entitled.
m See note 9 supra.
"1 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). See Hunwald, The
Right to Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, 31 Mo. L.
REv. 109 (1966).
' Comment, The Administration of Justice in the
Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July, 1967, supra
note 100, at 1609.
.44 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
i Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra
note 20; Sengstock, supra note 31, at 206; The Ad-
ministration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil
Disorder of July, 1967, supra note 100, at 1609.
1 CA. PEN. CODE § 861 (West 1956); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 954.05 (1958).
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cern after his arrest is to resume his normal life as
quickly as possible. Any extra appearance in court
will only further restrict his freedom.
The burden on the state in providing preliminary
examinations must also be considered. Counsel for
the prosecution must be provided. Witnesses for
the state often have to testify,"' which in a civil
disorder situation means the arresting officer will
have to testify. This takes him off the streets. In
normal times, it is inconceivable that a state should
have to provide a preliminary examination for one
charged with a traffic offense: the state would spend
more money than it would take in on the ticket.
A distinction might be drawn between petty
offenses and serious crimes, as in the jury trial
area."' But perhaps the best answer for both the
state and the accused is to release the accused on
bail, have his lawyer try to negotiate with the
prosecuting attorney and in absence of agreement
as to plea, proceed directly to trial.
D. Lack of Remedies
It is painfully apparent that in a riot situation,
where one's legal rights are violated either before
or during his arrest by the police, he may as a
practical matter be remediless."' Likewise, where
mass processing leads to the violation of one's legal
rights after his arrest, he may in fact have no
recourse.
As noted above, in many instances judges seem
to set bonds high with the express purpose of keep-
ing people off the streets. 2 In fact, during the
Detroit riots of 1967, one judge, Judge Robert J.
Colombo, publicly stated that this was the purpose
of the high bond:
What we're trying to do here is keep them off
the streets. And apparently we're being suc-
cessful at that. If we let them back on you
know what would happen.... In a way we're
doing what the police didn't do."'
This policy, which was also carried on in Chicago
in the riots of April, 1968,"2 was often in violation
n7 See, e.g., Asuz. R. Caim. P. 22; CoNN. GEN. STAT.§ 54-76a (1968); W.S.A. § 954.08 (1958).
"8 See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
ng See generally, WALER REPORT, supra note 34.
120 See notes 27 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
' The Detroit News, July 26, 1967, § A, at 12, col.
6. See Comment, The Administration of Justice in the
Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July, 1967, supra
note 100, at 1550.
M Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra note
20.
of statute,"' even as the statute is interpreted by
the chief judge of the local court. 24
The problem was to find a way to have the bond
reduced before several days had passed. It was
difficult to quickly petition for bond reduction
hearings because of the early restrictions on counsel
allowed in the courtroom and because magistrates
were not disposed to hold bond reduction hearings
immediately. 2 There were often not enough at-
torneys to file habeas corpus petitions. When such
petitions were filed, the local court often held them
for several days before returning them."8 Where
petitions could have been filed in the appellate
courts for writs of superintending control,"' law-
yers did not file them because they felt they would
do no good." The next step was to petition the
federal district court for writs of habeas corpus;
but federal courts will not grant the writs unless
state remedies have been exhausted or unless such
remedies are ". . . ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner." "' Furthermore, if they had been
filed and the exhaustion hurdle had been overcome,
the issue might have been moot by the time the
federal court was prepared to hear itV30
Since the process of proceeding from one court
to another, presenting motions and petitions,
attending hearings, and waiting out possible
adjournments is apt to be quite time-consum-
ing, the problem during the disorder would
have been to obtain adequate review before
"' E.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 110-5(a), see note
21. supra
See also Ginsberg, infra note 124, at 207.
"uBoyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 17 DE
PAUL L. Rxv. 267 (1968). See also Ginsberg, Volunteer
Lawyers Retrieve Due Process in Chicago, 26 LEGAL
Am Biz CAsE 207 (1968).
2- Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra note
20..
26 Comment, The Administration of Justice in the
Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July, 1967, supra
note 100, at 1577-78.
As Professor Sengstock has said,
If the object in setting a bond was to keep an
individual in jail, the honest way of accomplishing
this would have been to deny bond altogether and
to let the denial be tested with a writ of habeas
corpus.
Sengstock, Riots and Mass Criminal Justice: The
Collapse of the Bill of Rights, 26 LEGAL Am Baxxr
CAsE 201, 203 (1968).
"'See Comment, The Administration of Justice in
the Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July, 1967,
supa note 102, at 1582.
Sengstock, supra note 126, at 204-05.
'9 28 U.S.C. § 22540() (1968).120 Sengstock, supra note 100, at 204-05.
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the issue was mooted by a reduction of bail
or trial?"
Obtaining adequate review was almost impossible
and the arrestee often remained in jail for a week
before the court voluntarily held a bond reduction
hearing and reduced the bond. The hearings usually
took place after most of the trouble in the streets
had subsided."
If the accused is subsequently convicted, the
fact that bail was refused or excessive will not be
grounds for reversal unless he can show not only
that his detention was illegal but that he was
prejudiced at trial because of it."l As a practical
matter this may be impossible to prove,"' espe-
cially since trial may not be held for months after
the accused is released."' This delay would seem
to give a defendant ample time to locate his wit-
nesses, even though because of his detention he
may never be able to do so. He will have to prove
that it was his illegal detention, and not his own
inefficiency, that prevented him from locating his
witnesses in light of the fact that he had several
months to do so.
Generally a civil action for false imprisonment
will lie for unreasonable delay in bringing an ar-
rested person before a magistrate. 38 The action
i Comment, The Administration of Justice in the
Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July, 1967, supra
note 100, at 1582.
13 Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra note
20.
m Fitts v. United States, 335 F.2d 1021 (10th Cir.y,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 979 (1964); Spaulding v. United
States., 279 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir) cert. denied, 364 U.S.887 (1960).
"u Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra
note 20.
"5 As of February 6, 1969, according to Chicago
Corporation Counsel's Office, 226 cases were still
pending out of 676 arrested during convention week
in Chicago.
13"Thurston v. Leo, 124 Vt. 298,204A.2d 106 (1964);
State v. Maldonado, 92 Ariz. 70, 373 P.2d 583 (1962);
Lincoln v. Grazer, 163 Cal. App. 2d 758, 329 P.2d
928 (1958); Great Americam Indem. Co. v. Beverly,
150 F. Supp. 134 (D.C. Ga. 1956) (applying Georgia
law).
Under certain circumstances an action may lie for
the violation of one's federal civil rights under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985
(1964). That act has served as the basis for damage
actions against police officers for jailhouse beatings,
Hughes v. Smith, 389 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1968); illegal
searches and seizures, Monroe Y. -Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); and illegal arrests, Funk v. Cable, 251 F. Supp.
598 (M.D. Pa. 1966); among other actions. Problems
of proof'are no easier here than at common law, how-
ever. For an introduction into this complicated field,
see Comment, Civil Action for Damages. Under the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEx. L. Riv. 1015 (1967);
Comment, Exhaustion of State Refijedies in Suits Under
may be directed at the arresting officer,1" or any
other person who is responsible for the officer's
failure to take the party before a magistrate with-
out unreasonable delayP s A false imprisonment
action will also generally lie against an arresting
officer139 or another who is responsible for the
wrongful denial of the opportunity to give bond. 40
An action will not be successful against the judge if
he had jurisdiction to set the amount of bail.4
Furthermore, once the judge exercises his discre-
tion in setting or refusing bail, the arresting officer
is probably relieved of any liability thereafter."'
And even if the other obstacles could be overcome,
plaintiff would have to prove that the officer's
delay in bringing him before a magistrate was un-
duly long or that the magistrate's refusal to grant
bail which the plaintiff could meet, was unreason-
able.14' In light of the fact that a civil disturbance
was in progress at the time, with the result that
the arresting officer was unusually busy and the
judge probably had more arrestees than usual with
which to contend, proof of a claim of false im-
prisonment will not be easily established.
IV. WHAT CAN BE DoNE
When a lawyer who viewed the process first
hand was asked what could be done to help the
situation, his response was "Very simple, follow
the recommendations of the Kerner Commission
Report, Chapter 13." 1" In the Report, the Kerner
Commission in summary recommended the follow-
ing: that the lower criminal courts be reformed to
the Civil Rights Act, 68 CoLm. L. REv. 1201 (1967);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Basista v. Weir,
340 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963); Antelope v. George, 211
F. Supp. 657 (D. Idaho 1962).
W Dragna v. White, 45 Cal. 2d 469, 289 P.2d 428
(1955).
m Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. Ct.App.
1957); Cannon v. Krakowitch, 54 N.J. Super. 93,
148 A.2d 213 (1959).
19 Sheffield v. Reece, 201 Miss. 133, 28 So. 2d 745
(1947); Jackson v. Thompson, 188 S.W.2d 853 (Mo.
App. 1945).
140 Anderson v. Spencer, 229 Iowa 595, 294 N.W. 904
(1940); Jackson v. Thompson, 188 S.W.2d 853 (Mo.
App. 1945).
" At common law judges are immune from liability
for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction
even if the acts were committed maliciously and cor-
ruptly. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1872). This common law immunity was not abolished
by" the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
' Smith v. Lott, 73 Idaho 205, 249 P.2d 803 (1952).
4 Cases are collected in 98 A.L.R.2d 966.
' Interview with Mr. Kermit Coleman, supra
note 20.
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ensure fair justice for all individuals; that com-
munities work out a plan, with all segments of the
community participating, for administering during
riots, which plan should specify certain police pro-
cedures such as alternatives to arrest and should
make provision for additional counsel and court
personnel; that multiple-use processing forms and
station house summonses be used instead of present
arrest and processing procedures; that the bar be
mobilized to provide adequate representation of
riot defendants; that alternative conditions to
release be used rather than the present system of
setting high bails to keep people off the streets; 45
and that indictments, arraignments and sentencing
be conducted on an individual basis rather than
in mass. 46
There is a good deal of evidence to substantiate
the Commission's conclusion that lack of planning
has played an important role in the breakdown of
the administration of justice during civil disturb-
ances. Correction facilities were not equipped to
handle mass arrests, partly because they are over-
crowded even in ordinary times. 4 Police planning
was either lacking completely or deficientA Court
congestion added to the problem.' 49 There were
inadequate numbers of prosecution and defense
counsel on hand. 50 Finally, even if there had been
adequate planning with respect to one part of the
criminal justice system, the system as a whole
failed because the parts were not sufficiently co-
ordinated to deal with the great number of
arrests. 5
If those responsible for the administration of
justice plan their emergency procedures in advance,
there would be a greater chance that when the
145 For a short but striking presentation of how bail
is set mechanically and used to keep people off the
streets, see For the Record-Bail in Chicago, 3 CPzn. L.
BuLL. 665 (1967).
146yKMR ComfssIoN REPORT, supra note 29,
at 344-57.
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REPORT: TnE PoLIcE 49 (1967); Leary, Law Enforce-
ment and the Crisis in the Cities, 156 N.Y.L.J.4 (1966).
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REPORT, supra note 148, The Courts, Chapter 7.50 Dodds and Dempsey, Civil Disorders: The Impact
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BxLN. L. REv. 355, 361-63 (1969).
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wNT AND ADmmiSTRATION OP JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 280 (1969); REPORT
To MAYOR ELECT JoHN V. LINDSAY BY THE LAW EN-
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emergency arises justice will be administered in a
fair and orderly manner rather than haphazardly
and in mass. If such plans were in effect, it seems
less likely that courthouses would fall victim to
mob psychology and that judges would feel that
their primary function in civil disorders is to "keep
them off the streets" and do "what the police
didn't do." 152
Further legislation and application to misde-
meanor prosecutions of constitutional rights will
help, but they are not the complete answeri'l
What is needed, as the Kerner Commission Report
points out, is concentrated, coordinated efforts by
legislatures, police administrators, bar associations
and courts to assure that justice does not depend
upon what is happening in the streets outside.
There must be an attempt to conduct business as
usual in the courts even if business is far from usual
in the streets. The exact procedures to be followed
will of course vary according to the logistics of the
particular city. The Report therefore gave few
details concerning its recommended plan, yet the
basic idea of establishing a plan is sound.'
V. CONCLUSION
We are told that due process is the cornerstone of
American jurisprudence. Yet while an accused
misdemeanant arrested during a civil disturbance
sees his rights trampled, he has, in effect, no pre-
trial or post-trial criminal remedy and whatever
civil remedy he might enjoy is almost impossible
to realize. Much of the time laws exist to protect
his rights. What is needed is a change in attitude
on the part of those whose duty it is to enforce and
apply the law. Implementations of the recom-
mendations of the Kerner Commission should be a
useful first step in changing those attitudes.
"'See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
M The state laws regarding bail, for instance, may
be quite adequate, but in practice they are sometimes
ignored. See notes 119-124 supra and accompanying
text.
'
1 Several cities have adopted plans which follow
many of the Commission's recommendations. One
such city is New York, which has established the
Criminal Justice Coordinating Counsel, a multi-agency
body. An ad hoc Counsel Committee on the Admin-
istration of Justice During Emergency Conditions
was formed and made recommendations. Legislation
of various kinds was enacted and a plan was developed.
The plan is designed to cover arrest and booking pro-
cedures; issuance in some cases of station house sum-
monses; simplification of forms; transportation of
police and arrestees; dissemination of information
concerning the location of arrestees; detention facilities;
mobilization of lawyers, judges and non-legal personnel;
preliminary hearing; and bail policy and procedures.
For a more thorough analysis, see Dodds and Dempsey,
supra note 150, at 375-91.
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